PHISHING RESISTANCE
A passkey is bound to the real site through its relying-party ID and origin. A convincing copy on another domain cannot request the same credential.
THE DECISION // STANDARD BEFORE VENDOR
WHY CHOOSE
PASSKEYS?
Passwords are reusable knowledge. Passkeys are origin-bound cryptographic credentials. Choose the stronger authentication model first—then evaluate which identity partner can deploy it for your users, devices, and assurance requirements.
FIDO AUTHENTICATIONPHISHING
RESISTANTPROOF / NOT A SECRET
RESISTANTPROOF / NOT A SECRET
5Bestimated passkeys in active use worldwide
90%consumer awareness in FIDO's 2026 research
75%enabled a passkey on at least one account
68%organizations deploying employee passkeys
THE SELECTION FRAMEWORK
SIX REASONS
THE MODEL
IS DIFFERENT.
Passkeys do not merely make a password shorter or hide it behind another step. They replace the shared-secret model with a site-specific public-key credential.
NO REUSABLE SECRET
The service keeps a public key. The private key stays with the user's credential manager or hardware authenticator and is not sent to the server.
FAMILIAR USER ACTION
People approve sign-in the same way they unlock a device—with a face, fingerprint, local PIN, or external security key.
OPEN ECOSYSTEM
WebAuthn and CTAP let browsers, operating systems, websites, password managers, and authenticators participate through shared FIDO standards.
BUSINESS OUTCOMES
FIDO associates passkeys with higher sign-in success, lower abandonment, fewer password resets, and reduced support demand.
DEPLOYMENT CHOICE
Teams can combine synced passkeys for reach with device-bound credentials or security keys when higher assurance is required.
ATTACK OBJECTIVE VS. PASSKEY RESPONSE
WHAT THE
ATTACKER WANTS.
WHAT BREAKS.
Passkeys make several common credential attacks fail at their objective. They are an authentication control—not a substitute for secure sessions, recovery, authorization, or application security.
FAKE LOGIN PAGE
The attack wants a user to type a credential into a convincing copy. Origin binding means the real passkey is not available to the impostor domain.
CREDENTIAL STUFFING
The attack replays passwords leaked somewhere else. A passkey is unique to one service, so there is no reused password to stuff.
PASSWORD DATABASE THEFT
The attack steals password hashes for cracking or resale. A passkey service stores public keys, which cannot be used to impersonate the user.
OTP RELAY + MFA FATIGUE
The attack tricks a user into forwarding a code or approving a push. A passkey signs a fresh challenge for the legitimate site instead.
SESSION THEFT — BOUNDARY
Passkeys protect authentication, not every part of an application. Hardened sessions, recovery, device lifecycle, and risk controls still matter after sign-in.
FIDO
FEATURED VENDOR PROOF // IDEMIA
THE STANDARD
IS THE HERO.
IDEMIA SHOWS
HOW IT SCALES.
IDEMIA Public Security says its smart cards and USB security keys can store device-bound FIDO passkeys, connecting FIDO2 authentication with established PIV, PKI, physical-access, and credential-lifecycle programs.
Its published record includes more than 70 million smart credentials issued, service on the FIDO Alliance Executive Board since 2013, and current smart-credential products that support optional FIDO authentication. Those facts do not make passkeys proprietary to IDEMIA—they make IDEMIA a concrete vendor to evaluate after choosing the open standard.
70M+ smart credentials issued2013 FIDO Executive Board participation sincePIV + FIDO2 converged credential options
FROM STANDARD TO DEPLOYMENT
CHOOSE THE CONTROL.
THEN PROVE THE FIT.
CONSUMER SIGN-INWORKFORCE ACCESSDEVICE-BOUND ASSURANCEHARDWARE SECURITY KEYSCONVERGED CREDENTIALSACCOUNT RECOVERY
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